Igor Jašurek – Faculty of National Economy of the University of Economics in Bartislava, Dolnozemská cesta 1 852 35, Slovakia

 

DOI: https://doi.org/10.31410/LIMEN.2020.141

 

6th International Scientific-Business Conference – LIMEN 2020 – Leadership, Innovation, Management and Economics: Integrated Politics of Research – CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Online/virtual, November 26, 2020, published by the Association of Economists and Managers of the Balkans, Belgrade; Printed by: SKRIPTA International, Belgrade, ISBN 978-86-80194-39-4, ISSN 2683-6149, DOI: https://doi.org/10.31410/LIMEN.2020

 

Abstract

Implementation of cohesion policy, as the major EU budgetary chapter, is subject
to vast scholarship. Therefore, surprisingly enough, the principal-agent (P-A) framework has
received little recognition in this academic field so far. The present paper contributes to the
expansion of this increasingly popular approach also into cohesion scholarship by examining
the operation of Information and Consultancy Centres (ICC) in Slovakia. The major finding
shows limits of the P-A framework by suggesting that instead of a mutual conflict, it is a
cooperative mode dominantly shaping dynamics of P-A relations due to the shared goals and
interests. ICC operations and relations with the Government are interpreted via observational
equivalence and ceremonialism as the recognized P-A framework tools.

 

Keywords

ICC, Principal, Agent, Uncertainty costs, Observational equivalence, Ceremonialism.

 

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